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Abstract
Background: Recent developments in Global Workspace theory suggest that human
consciousness can suffer interpenetrating dysfunctions of mutual and reciprocal interaction with
embedding environments which will have early onset and often insidious staged developmental
progression, possibly according to a cancer model, in which a set of long-evolved control strategies
progressively fails.
Methods and results: A rate distortion argument implies that, if an external information source
carries a damaging 'message', then sufficient exposure to it, particularly during critical
developmental periods, is sure to write a sufficiently accurate image of it on mind and body in a
punctuated manner so as to initiate or promote similarly progressively punctuated developmental
disorder, in essence either a staged failure affecting large-scale brain connectivity, which is the sine
qua non of human consciousness, or else damaging the ability of embedding goal contexts to
contain conscious dynamics.
Conclusion: The key intervention, at the population level, is clearly to limit exposure to factors
triggering developmental disorders, a question of proper environmental sanitation, in a large sense,
primarily a matter of social justice which has long been known to be determined almost entirely by
the interactions of cultural trajectory, group power relations, and economic structure, with public
policy. Intervention at the individual level appears limited to triggering or extending periods of
remission, representing reestablishment of an extensive, but largely unexplored, spectrum of
evolved control strategies, in contrast with the far better-understood case of cancer.
Introduction
Mental disorders in humans are not well understood.
Indeed, such classifications as the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders – fourth edition, [1], the stand-
ard descriptive nosology in the US, have been character-
ized as 'prescientific' by Gilbert [2] and others. Arguments
from genetic determinism fail, in part because of an
apparently draconian population bottleneck which, early
in our species' history, resulted in an overall genetic diver-
sity less than that observed within and between contem-
porary chimpanzee subgroups. Arguments from
psychosocial stress fare better, but are affected by the
apparently complex and contingent developmental paths
determining the onset of schizophrenia – one of the most
prevalent serious mental disorders – dementias, psycho-
ses, and so forth, some of which may be triggered in utero
by exposure to infection, low birthweight, or other stres-
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may also be broadly developmental [3].
Gilbert suggests an extended evolutionary perspective, in
which evolved mechanisms like the 'flight-or-fight'
response are inappropriately excited or suppressed, result-
ing in such conditions as anxiety or post traumatic stress
disorders. Nesse [4] suggests that depression may repre-
sent the dysfunction of an evolutionary adaptation which
down-regulates foraging activity in the face of unattaina-
ble goals.
Kleinman and Good, however, ([5], p. 492) have outlined
some of the cross cultural subtleties affecting the study of
depression which seem to argue against any simple evolu-
tionary interpretation:
"When culture is treated as a constant (as is common
when studies are conducted in our own society), it is rela-
tively easy to view depression as a biological disorder, trig-
gered by social stressors in the presence of ineffective
support, and reflected in a set of symptoms or complaints
that map back onto the biological substrate of the disor-
der... However, when culture is treated as a significant var-
iable, for example, when the researcher seriously
confronts the world of meaning and experience of mem-
bers of non-Western societies, many of our assumptions
about the nature of emotions and illness are cast in sharp
relief. Dramatic differences are found across cultures in
the social organization, personal experience, and conse-
quences of such emotions as sadness, grief, and anger, of
behaviors such as withdrawal or aggression, and of psy-
chological characteristics such as passivity and helpless-
ness or the resort to altered states of consciousness. They
are organized differently as psychological realities, com-
municated in a wide range of idioms, related to quite var-
ied local contexts of power relations, and are interpreted,
evaluated, and responded to as fundamentally different
meaningful realities... Depressive illness and dysphoria
are thus not only interpreted differently in non-Western
societies and across cultures; they are constituted as funda-
mentally different forms of social reality."
More generally, Kleinman and Cohen [6] find that
" [S]everal myths... have become central to psychiatry...
The first is that the forms of mental illness everywhere dis-
play similar degrees of prevalence... [Second is] an exces-
sive adherence to a principle known as the pathogenic/
pathoplastic dichotomy, which holds that biology is
responsible for the underlying structure of a malaise,
whereas cultural beliefs shape the specific ways in which a
person experiences it. The third myth maintains that vari-
ous unusual culture-specific disorders whose biological
bases are uncertain occur only in exotic places outside the
West... In an effort to base psychiatry in 'hard' science and
thus raise its status to that of other medical disciplines,
psychiatrists have narrowly focused on the biological
underpinnings of mental disorders while discounting the
importance of such 'soft' variables as culture and socioe-
conomic status..."
Further, serious mental disorders in humans are often
comorbid among themselves – depression and anxiety,
compulsive behaviors, psychotic ideation, etc. – and with
serious chronic physical conditions such as coronary heart
disease, atherosclerosis, diabetes, hypertension, dyslipi-
demia, and so on. These too are increasingly recognized as
developmental in nature (see [7,8] for references), and are
frequently compounded by behavioral problems like vio-
lence or substance use and abuse. Indeed, smoking, alco-
hol and drug addiction, compulsive eating, and the like,
are often done as self-medication for the impacts of psy-
chosocial and other stressors, constituting socially-
induced 'risk behaviors' which synergistically accelerate a
broad spectrum of mental and physical problems.
Recent research on schizophrenia, dyslexia, and autism,
supports a 'brain connectivity' model for these disorders
which is of considerable interest from a global workspace
perspective, since large-scale brain connectivity is essen-
tial for the operation of consciousness, a principal, and
very old, evolutionary adaptation in higher animals.
Burns et al. [9], on the basis of sophisticated diffusion ten-
sor magnetic resonance imaging studies, find that schizo-
phrenia is a disorder of large-scale neurocognitive
networks rather than specific regions, and that pathologi-
cal changes in the disorder should be sought at the supra-
regional level. Both structural and functional abnormali-
ties in frontoparietal networks have been described and
may constitute a basis for the wide range of cognitive
functions impaired in the disorder, such as selective atten-
tion, language processing and attribution of agency.
Silani et al. [10] find that, for dyslexia, altered activation
observed within the reading system is associated with
altered density of grey and white matter of specific brain
regions, such as the left middle and inferior temporal gyri
and left arcuate fasciculus. This supports the view that dys-
lexia is associated with both local grey matter dysfunction
and with altered [larger scale] connectivity among phono-
logical/reading areas.
Villalobos et al. [11] explore the hypothesis that large-
scale abnormalities of the dorsal stream and possibly the
mirror neuron system, may be responsible for impair-
ments of joint attention, imitation, and secondarily for
language delays in autism. Their empirical study showed
that those with autism had significantly reduced connec-Page 2 of 13
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patible with the hypothesis of mirror neuron defects in
autism. More generally, their results suggest that dorsal
stream connectivity in autism may not be fully functional.
Courchesne and Pierce [12] suggest that, for autism, con-
nectivity within the frontal lobe is excessive, disorganized,
and inadequately selective, whereas connectivity between
frontal cortex and other systems is poorly synchronized,
weakly responsive and information impoverished.
Increased local but reduced long-distance cortical-cortical
reciprocal activity and coupling would impair the funda-
mental frontal function of integrating information from
widespread and diverse systems and providing complex
context-rich feedback, guidance and control to lower-level
systems.
Coplan [13] has observed a striking pattern of excessive
frontal lobe self-connectivity in certain cases of anxiety
disorder, and Coplan et al. [14] find that maternal stress
can affect long-term hippocampal neurodevelopment in a
primate model.
As stated, brain connectivity is the sine qua non of the
Global Workspace model of consciousness, and further
analysis suggests that these disorders cannot be fully
understood in the absence of a functional theory of con-
sciousness, and in particular, of a detailed understanding
of the elaborate regulatory mechanisms which must have
evolved over the past half billion years to ensure the sta-
bility of that most central and most powerful of adapta-
tions.
Distortion of consciousness is not simply an epiphenom-
enon of the emotional dysregulation which many see as
the 'real' cause of mental disorder. Like the pervasive
effects of culture, distortion of consciousness lies at the
heart of both the individual experience of mental disorder
and the effect of it on the embedding of the individual
within both social relationships and cultural or environ-
mental milieu. Distortion of consciousness in mental dis-
orders inhibits both routine social interaction and the
ability to meet internalized or expected cultural norms, a
potentially destabilizing positive feedback. Distortion of
consciousness profoundly affects the ability to learn new,
or change old, skills in the face of changing patterns of
threat or opportunity, perhaps the most critical purpose of
the adaptation itself. Distortion of consciousness, particu-
larly any decoupling from social and cultural context, is
usually a threat to long-term individual survival, and
those with mental disorders significantly affecting con-
sciousness typically face shortened lifespans.
This paper will review some recent advances in conscious-
ness theory, and apply the results toward a refocus on the
role of that adaptation in mental disorders, using an infor-
mation theory formalism which draws a parallel between
punctuated evolutionary and cognitive/learning forms of
information transmission [15]. The method stands in
contrast to neural network studies of mental disorder,
(e.g. [16]). As Krebs [17] has argued, neural network mod-
els of mental function fall victim to a 'sufficiency indeter-
minacy' in the same sense that the Ptolemaic system of
astronomy, with its endless epicycle-upon-epicycle Fou-
rier series expansion of planetary dynamics, fails in com-
parison with the Newtonian analysis of central
gravitational motion. That is, as Krebs puts it, neural pos-
sibility does not imply neural plausibility, and neural net-
work computer models of mental phenomena can be
constructed to do literally whatever one wants, in the
same sense that a Fourier series can be constructed to
approximate any function over a fixed interval without
providing much basic understanding of that function.
Our comparison of punctuated evolutionary adaptation
with cognitive learning plateaus is counterintuitive: evolu-
tion is not a cognitive process. Cognition involves an
active selection of one out of a complex repertory of pos-
sible responses to a sensory input, based on comparison
with a learned representation of the outer world (e.g.
[18,19]). Although genes, or in the case of human biol-
ogy, a composite of genes-and-culture (e.g. [20]), do
indeed constitute a kind of 'memory' of past interaction
with the world, response to selection pressure is not
through direct comparison with that 'memory', but rather
through the reproductive success of a random variation
constrained by the path of evolutionary history. This is
not cognition, and there can be no 'intelligent purpose' to
adaptive or evolutionary process. Nonetheless, selection
pressures represent systematic patterns of interaction with
an embedding and highly structured ecosystem in which
each species is itself manifest. We will, below, use this per-
spective to infer a rough analog between developmental
onset and progression of a broad class of mental disorders
and the onset and progression of a certain class of cancers.
Recent resumption of scientific research on consciousness
in humans follows from Baars' [21] pioneering restate-
ment of the problem in terms of a global workspace the-
ory [21,22], to which the reader should refer for more
details.
The central ideas are as follows [22]:
(1) The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed
specialized networks (processors).
(2) Consciousness is associated with a global workspace
in the brain – a fleeting memory capacity whose focal con-Page 3 of 13
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scious specialized networks.
(3) Conversely, a global workspace can also serve to inte-
grate many competing and cooperating input networks.
(4) Some unconscious networks, called contexts, shape
conscious contents, for example unconscious parietal
maps modulate visual feature cells that underlie the per-
ception of color in the ventral stream.
(5) Such contexts work together jointly to constrain con-
scious events.
(6) Motives and emotions can be viewed as goal contexts.
(7) Executive functions work as hierarchies of goal con-
texts.
Although this basic approach has been systematically
elaborated upon for nearly twenty years by a number of
quite eminent researchers, consciousness studies has only
recently, in the context of a deluge of data from brain
imaging experiments, come to the point of actually digest-
ing the perspective and moving on.
The Baars model has received increasing experimental ver-
ification over the last two decades (e.g. [23,24]). Since it
particularly attempts to properly represent the matter of
embedding and interpenetrating contexts, it provides a
basis for understanding the synergism of consciousness
and mental disorders in humans, in particular the role of
embedding social and cultural contexts, and for drawing a
parallel with the initiation and progression of cancer as a
disorder of information, which is more fully discussed in
[25].
My own recent work provides a rigorous mathematical
formulation of the GW blackboard model, in terms of an
iterated, second-order, contextually-embedded, hierarchi-
cal General Cognitive Model (GCM) crudely analogous to
hierarchical regression. It is, however, based on the Shan-
non-McMillan rather than on the Central Limit Theorem,
and is strongly supplemented by methodologies from
topological manifold theory and differential geometry
[3,8,26]. Recent results [26] suggest that, in fact, it should
be possible to make a rigorous theory of 'all possible' GW
blackboard models, much in the same sense that the
Church lambda calculus describes 'conventional' comput-
ers and the Nix/Vose Markov chain treatment describes
many possible genetic algorithms [27,28].
We begin with a simplified analysis focusing on modular
networks of interacting cognitive substructures, and par-
ticularly study the importance of their embedding in pro-
gressively larger systems. More complicated examples,
involving renormalization treatment of phase transitions
affecting information sources, iterated to second order,
can be found in [8].
The simplest modular network global 
workspace model
Cognition as 'language'
Cognition is not consciousness. Indeed, most mental, and
many physiological, functions, while cognitive in a partic-
ular formal sense, hardly ever become entrained into the
Global Workspace of consciousness. For example, one sel-
dom is able to consciously regulate immune function,
blood pressure, or the details of binocular tracking and
bipedal motion, except to decide 'what shall I look at',
'where shall I walk'. Nonetheless, many cognitive proc-
esses, conscious or unconscious, appear intimately related
to 'language', broadly speaking. The construction is sur-
prisingly straightforward [8,29].
We begin the formal analysis with a very general, and
hence deceptively 'weak', mathematical treatment of cog-
nitive process [8,29].
Atlan and Cohen [19] and Cohen [18] argue, in the con-
text of immune cognition, that the essence of cognitive
function involves comparison of a perceived signal with
an internal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon
that comparison, choice of one response from a much
larger repertoire of possible responses.
Cognitive pattern recognition-and-response, from this
view, proceeds by functionally combining an incoming
'external sensory signal' with an internal 'ongoing activ-
ity', incorporating the learned picture of the world, and
triggering some appropriate action based on a decision
that the pattern of sensory activity requires a response. An
explicit neural network example is given in Wallace ([8]
pp. 34–36).
More formally, a pattern of sensory input is mixed in an
unspecified but systematic manner with a pattern of inter-
nal ongoing activity to create a path of combined signals
x = (a0, a1, ..., an, ...). Each ak thus represents some algorith-
mic composition of internal and external signals.
This path is fed into a highly nonlinear, but otherwise
similarly unspecified, nonlinear decision oscillator which
generates an output h(x) that is an element of one of two
disjoint sets B0 and B1 of possible system responses. Let
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.Page 4 of 13
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h(x) ∈ B0,
the pattern is not recognized, and if
h(x) ∈ B1,
the pattern is recognized, and some action bj, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
Again, for concrete examples see [8], pp. 34–36.
The principal objects of interest are paths x which trigger
pattern recognition-and-response exactly once. That is,
given a fixed initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0, we exam-
ine all possible subsequent paths x beginning with a0 and
leading exactly once to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus h(a0, ...,
aj) ∈ B0 for all j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1. Wallace [8]
examines the possibility of more complicated schemes as
well.
For each positive integer n, let N(n) be the number of high
probability 'grammatical' and 'syntactical' paths of length
n which begin with some particular a0 having h(a0) ∈ B0
and lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B1. Call such high prob-
ability paths 'meaningful', assuming, not unreasonably,
that N(n) will be considerably less than the number of all
possible paths of length n leading from a0 to the condition
h(x) ∈ B1. To reiterate, details of, and more elaborate jus-
tifications for, this approach are to be found in [8].
While combining algorithm, the form of the nonlinear
oscillator, and the details of grammar and syntax, can all
remain unspecified in this model, the critical mathemati-
cal assumption which permits inference on necessary con-
ditions is that the finite limit
both exists and is independent of the path x.
We call such a pattern recognition-and-response cognitive
process ergodic. Not all cognitive processes are likely to be
ergodic, implying that H, if it indeed exists at all, is path
dependent, although extension to 'nearly' ergodic proc-
esses is possible [8].
Invoking the spirit of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, it
is possible to define an adiabatically, piecewise stationary,
ergodic information source X associated with stochastic
variates Xj having joint and conditional probabilities P(a0,
..., an) and P (an|a0, ..., an-1) such that appropriate joint and
conditional Shannon uncertainties satisfy the classic rela-
tions
This information source is defined as dual to the underly-
ing ergodic cognitive process [8].
The Shannon uncertainties H(...) are cross-sectional law-
of-large-numbers sums of the form -Σk Pk log[Pk], where
the Pk constitute a probability distribution. See [30-32] for
the standard details.
The giant component
A formal equivalence class algebra (and hence a groupoid,
sensu Weinstein [33]) can be constructed by choosing dif-
ferent origin points a0 and defining equivalence by the
existence of a high probability meaningful path connect-
ing two points. Disjoint partition by equivalence class,
analogous to orbit equivalence classes for dynamical sys-
tems, defines the vertices of the proposed network of cog-
nitive dual languages. Each vertex then represents a
different information source dual to a cognitive process.
We now suppose that linkages can fleetingly occur
between the ordinarily disjoint cognitive modules defined
by this algebra. In the spirit of [8], this is represented by
establishment of a non-zero mutual information measure
between them: cross-talk.
Wallace [8] describes this structure in terms of fixed mag-
nitude disjunctive strong ties which give the equivalence
class partitioning of modules, and nondisjunctive weak
ties which link modules across the partition, and para-
metizes the overall structure by the average strength of the
weak ties, to use Granovetter's [34] term. By contrast the
approach here, initially, is to simply look at the average
number of fixed-strength nondisjunctive links in a ran-
dom topology. These are obviously the two analytically
tractable limits of a much more complicated regime
which we believe ultimately includes 'all possible' global
workspace models.
Since we know nothing about how the cross-talk connec-
tions can occur, we will – for purposes of illustration only
– assume they are random and construct a random graph
in the classic Erdos/Renyi manner. Suppose there are M
disjoint cognitive modules – M elements of the equiva-
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ble graph.
As Corless et al. [35] discuss, when a graph with M vertices
has m = (1/2)aM edges chosen at random, for a > 1 it
almost surely has a giant connected component having
approximately gM vertices, with
g(a) = 1 + W(-a exp(-a))/a,  (2)
where W is the Lambert-W function defined implicitly by
the relation
W(x) exp(W(x)) = x.  (3)
Figure 1 shows g(a), displaying what is clearly a sharp
phase transition at a = 1.
Such a phase transition initiates a new, collective, shifting,
cognitive phenomenon: the Global Workspace, a tunable
blackboard defined by a set of cross-talk mutual informa-
tion measures between interacting unconscious cognitive
submodules. The source uncertainty, H, of the language
dual to the collective cognitive process, which defines the
richness of the cognitive language of the workspace, will
grow as some function of g, as more and more uncon-
scious processes are incorporated into it. Wallace [8]
examines what, in effect, are the functional forms H ∝
exp(αg), α ln [1/(1-g)], and (1/(1-g))δ, letting R = 1/1 - g
define a 'characteristic length' in the renormalization
scheme. While these all have explicit solutions for the
renormalization calculation (mostly in terms of the Lam-
bert-W function), other, less tractable, expressions are cer-
tainly plausible, for example H ∝ gγ,γ > 0, γ real.
Given a particular H(g), the quite different approach of [8]
involves adjusting universality class parameters of the
phase transition, a matter requiring much mathematical
development.
By contrast, in this new class of models, the degree of clus-
tering of the graph of cognitive modules might, itself, be
tunable, producing a variable threshold for conscious-
ness: a topological shift, which should be observable from
brain-imaging studies. Second order iteration would lead
to an analog of the hierarchical cognitive model of [8].
Wallace [8] focuses on changing the average strength of
weak ties between unconscious submodules rather than
the average number of fixed-strength weak ties as is done
here, and tunes the universality class exponents of the
phase transition, which may also imply subtle shifts in
underlying topology.
Following Albert and Barabasi ([36], Section V), we note
that real networks differ from random graphs in that their
degree distribution, the probability of k linkages between
vertices, often follows a power law P(k) ≈ k-γ rather than
the Poisson distribution of random networks,
P(k) = ak exp(-a)/k!, k ≥ 0. Since power law networks do
not have any characteristic scale, they consequently
termed scale-free.
It is possible to extend the Erdos/Renyi threshold results
to such 'semi-random' graphs. For example, Luczak [37]
has shown that almost all random graphs with a fixed
degree smaller than 2 have a unique giant cluster. Molloy
and Reed [38,39] proved that, for a random graph with
degree distribution P(k), an infinite cluster emerges
almost surely when
Following Volz, [40], cluster tuning of random networks
leads to a counterintuitive result. Define the clustering
Q k k P k
k
≡ − > ( )
≥
∑ ( ) ( ) .2 0 4
1
Relative size of the largest connected component of a ran-dom graph, as a function of 2× the average number of fixed-stren th connections b twee v r icesFigure 1
Relative size of the largest connected component of a ran-
dom graph, as a function of 2× the average number of fixed-
strength connections between vertices. W is the Lambert-W 
function, or the ProductLog in Mathematica, which solves the 
relation W(x) exp[W(x)] = x. Note the sharp threshold at a = 
1, and the subsequent topping-out.'Tuning' the giant compo-
nent by changing network topology generally leads to a family 
of similar curves, those having progressively higher threshold 
having correspondingly lower asymptotic limits (e.g. [41], fig. 
4).Page 6 of 13
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of the total number of potential triads, i.e.
where N∆ is the number of triads in the network and N3 is
the number of connected triples of nodes, noting that in
every triad there are three connected nodes. Taking the
approach of Molloy and Reed [38,39], Volz [40] shows
quite directly that, for a random network with parameter
a, at cluster value C, there is a critical value given by
If C = 0, i.e. no clustering, then the giant component forms
when a = 1. Increasing C raises the average number of
edges which must be present for a giant component to
form. For C ≥ , which is precisely the Golden
Section, where the denominator in this expression van-
ishes, no giant component can form, regardless of a. Not
all network topologies, then, can actually support a giant
component, and hence, in this model, consciousness.
This is of some importance, having obvious and deep
implications ranging from the evolutionary history of
consciousness to the nature of sleep.
A more complete exploration of the giant component can
be found, e.g. in Newman et al. [41], especially the discus-
sion leading to their figure 4. In general, 'tuning' of the GC
will generate a family of curves similar to figure 1, but
with those having threshold to the right of that in the plot
'topping out' at limits progressively less than 1: higher
thresholds seem usually to imply smaller giant compo-
nents. In sum, the giant component is itself highly tuna-
ble, replicating, in this model, the fundamental stream of
consciousness.
Note that we do not, in this paper, address the essential
matter of how the system of interacting cognitive modules
behaves away from critical points, particularly in the pres-
ence of 'external gradients'. Answering this question
requires the imposition of generalized Onsager relations,
which introduce complications of topological 'rate distor-
tion manifolds', metric structures, and the like (e.g. [3,8]).
Mutual and reciprocal interaction: evading the 
mereological fallacy
Just as a higher order information source, associated with
the GC of a random or semirandom graph, can be con-
structed out of the interlinking of unconscious cognitive
modules by mutual information, so too external informa-
tion sources, for example in humans the cognitive
immune and other physiological systems, and embedding
sociocultural structures, can be represented as slower-act-
ing information sources whose influence on the GC can
be felt in a collective mutual information measure. The
measure will, through the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition
Theorem which generalizes the Shannon-McMillan Theo-
rem, be the splitting criterion for high and low probability
joint paths across the entire system.
The tool for this is network information theory ([32], p.
387). Given three interacting information sources, Y1, Y2,
Z, the splitting criterion, taking Z as the 'external context',
is given by
I(Y1, Y2|Z) = H(Z) + H(Y1|Z) - H(Y1, Y2, Z),  (7)
where H(..|..) and H(.., .., ..) represent conditional and
joint uncertainties [30-32].
This generalizes to
If we assume the Global Workspace/GC/blackboard to
involve a very rapidly shifting, and indeed highly tunable,
dual information source X, embedding contextual cogni-
tive modules like the immune system will have a set of sig-
nificantly slower-responding sources Yj, j = 1..m, and
external social, cultural and other 'environmental' proc-
esses will be characterized by even more slowly-acting
sources Zk, k = 1..n. Mathematical induction on equation
(8) gives a complicated expression for a mutual informa-
tion splitting criterion between high and low probability
joint paths which we write as
I(X|Y1, .., Ym|Z1, .., Zn).  (9)
This encompasses a fully interpenetrating 'biopsychosoci-
ocultural' structure for individual consciousness, one in
which Baars' contexts act as important, but flexible,
boundary conditions, defining the underlying topology
available to the far more rapidly shifting global workspace
[3,8].
This result does not commit the mereological fallacy
which Bennett and Hacker [42] impute to excessively neu-
rocentric perspectives on consciousness in humans, that
is, the mistake of imputing to a part of a system the char-
acteristics which require functional entirety.
Punctuation phenomena for information 
systems
As quite a number of researchers have noted, in one way
















5 2 1 2/ /−
I Y Y Z H Z H Y Z H Y Y Zn j n
j
n
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , ).1 1
1
8… …= + − ( )
=
∑
Page 7 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling 2005, 2:49 http://www.tbiomed.com/content/2/1/49is homologous to the thermodynamic limit in the defini-
tion of the free energy density of a physical system. This
has the form
where F is the free energy density, K the inverse tempera-
ture, V the system volume, and Z(K) is the partition func-
tion defined by the system Hamiltonian.
Wallace [8] shows at some length how this homology per-
mits the natural transfer of renormalization methods
from statistical mechanics to information theory. In the
spirit of the Large Deviations Program of applied proba-
bility theory, this produces phase transitions and analogs
to evolutionary punctuation in systems characterized by
piecewise, adiabatically stationary, ergodic information
sources. These 'biological' phase changes appear to be
ubiquitous in natural systems and can be expected to
dominate machine behaviors as well, particularly those
which seek to emulate biological paradigms. Wallace [15]
uses these arguments to explore the differences and simi-
larities between evolutionary punctuation in genetic and
learning plateaus in neural systems. Punctuated phenom-
ena will emerge as important in the discussions below of
subtle information system malfunctions, be those systems
biological, social, or mechanical.
The second order iteration
Suppose the giant component of the modular network
associated with the Global Workspace of consciousness at
some 'time' k is characterized by a set of parameters Ak ≡
, ..., . Fixed parameter values define a particular
giant component structure. Suppose that, over a sequence
of 'times' the giant component can be characterized by a
path xn= A0, A1, ..., An-1 having significant serial correla-
tions which, in fact, permit definition of an adiabatically,
piecewise stationary, ergodic (APSE) information source
in the sense of [8]. Call that information source X. Sup-
pose, again in the manner of [8], that a set of (external or
else internal, systemic) signals impinging on conscious-
ness, i.e. the giant component, is also highly structured
and forms another APSE information source Y which
interacts not only with the system of interest globally, but
specifically with the tuning parameters of the giant com-
ponent characterized by X. Y is necessarily associated with
a set of paths yn.
Pair the two sets of paths into a joint path zn ≡ (xn, yn), and
invoke some inverse coupling parameter, K, between the
information sources and their paths. By the arguments of
the section above, this leads to phase transition punctua-
tion of I[K], the mutual information between X and Y,
under either the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem,
or, given a distortion measure, under the Rate Distortion
Theorem. I[K] is a splitting criterion between high and
low probability pairs of paths, and partakes of the homol-
ogy with free energy density described above. Attentional
focusing then itself becomes a punctuated event in
response to increasing linkage between the organism or
device and an external structured signal, or some particu-
lar system of internal events. This iterated argument paral-
lels the extension of the General Linear Model into the
Hierarchical Linear Model of regression theory.
Call this the Hierarchical Cognitive Model (HCM).
The dysfunctions of consciousness and 
intelligence: a cancer model
What is missing from this picture so far, and indeed will
prove central, is the elaborate control mechanisms which
must exist to ensure the integrity of the relation defined by
equation (9), so that the information source X, represent-
ing the Global Neuronal Workspace of consciousness,
remains confined to the topological structures defined by
the external contexts represented by the set of information
sources Z(k), k = 1...n. As a reviewer has noted, some men-
tal disorders, at least, might be identified with the failure
of these (social, cultural, and emotional) goal contexts to
successfully constrain conscious events. Others may act by
affecting the basic ability of the brain to engage in impor-
tant large-scale coordinated activities.
More generally, equation (9), informed by the homology
with equation (10), permits general discussion of the fail-
ure modes of global workspace systems of all kinds, in
particular of their second order iteration which appears to
be the analog to consciousness in higher animals.
The foundation for this lies in the Rate Distortion Theo-
rem. Under the conditions of that theorem, equation (9)
is the splitting criterion between high and low probability
joint paths defining the maximum rate at which an exter-
nal information source can write an image of itself having
a given maximum of distortion, according to some
defined measure [32,43]. Inverting the argument, equa-
tion (9) suggests that an external information source can,
if given enough time, write an image of itself upon con-
sciousness. That is, structures in Z-space can write images
of themselves on X. If that external source is pathogenic,
then, given sufficient exposure, some measure of con-
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of the pathological decoupling of X from the Z, as pathol-
ogies in Z-space may write an image of themselves onto
the very containment mechanisms which are supposed to
confine consciousness to the topology defined by cultural,
social, and emotional goal contexts, ensuring the integrity
of equation (9).
A more general discussion of comorbid mind/body disor-
ders in humans emerges quite naturally [7]. The picture,
in humans, then, is of a multifactorial and broadly inter-
penetrating mind/body/sociocultural dysfunction, often
having early onset and insidious, irregular, developmen-
tal progression. These disorders are, broadly speaking, dis-
torted images of pathogenic external environments which
are literally written upon the developing embryo, on the
growing child, and on the maturing adult ([8], Ch. 6).
Equation (9) suggests that, in similar form, these images
will be inevitably written upon consciousness as well, pos-
sibly through the failure of the mechanisms which are
supposed to constrain consciousness to the embedding
goal contexts.
Further consideration implies critical parallels with the
initiation and progression of cancer in multicellular
organisms, a quintessential disorder of information trans-
mission.
The analogy requires some development, which is con-
densed from the information dynamics analysis of [25].
Nunney [44] suggests that in larger animals, whose
lifespans are proportional to about the 4/10 power of
their cell count, prevention of cancer in rapidly proliferat-
ing tissues becomes more diffcult in proportion to their
size. Cancer control requires the development of addi-
tional mechanisms and systems with increasing cell count
to address tumorigenesis as body size increases – a syner-
gistic effect of cell number and organism longevity.
As Nunney puts it [44],
"This pattern may represent a real barrier to the evolution
of large, long-lived animals and predicts that those that do
evolve... have recruited additional controls [over those of
smaller animals] to prevent cancer."
In particular different tissues may have evolved markedly
different tumor control strategies. All of these, however,
are likely to be energetically expensive, permeated with
different complex signaling strategies, and subject to a
multiplicity of reactions to signals.
Work by Thaler [45] and Tenaillion et al. [46] suggests
that the mutagenic effects associated with a cell sensing its
environment and history could be as exquisitely regulated
as transcription. Invocation of the Rate Distortion or Joint
Asymptotic Equipartition Theorems in address of the
mutator necessarily means that mutational variation
comes to significantly reflect the grammar, syntax, and
higher order structures of embedding environmental
processes. This involves far more than a simple 'colored
noise' – stochastic excursions about a deterministic 'spine'
– and most certainly implies the need for exquisite regula-
tion. Thus there are deep information theory arguments in
favor of Thaler's speculation.
Thaler [45] further argues that the immune system pro-
vides an example of a biological system which ignores
conceptual boundaries between development and evolu-
tion.
Thaler specifically examines the meaning of the mutator
for the biology of cancer, which, like the immune system
it defies, is seen as involving both development and evo-
lution.
Thus Thaler, in essence, looks at the effect of structured
external stress on tumorigenesis and describes the 'local
evolution' of cancer within a tissue in terms of a 'punctu-
ated interpenetration' between a tumorigenic mutator
mechanism and an embedding cognitive process of muta-
tion control, including but transcending immune func-
tion.
The mutation control process constitutes the Darwinian
selection pressure determining the fate of the (path
dependent) output of a mutator mechanism. Externally-
imposed and appropriately structured environmental sig-
nals then jointly increases mutation rate while decreasing
mutation control effectiveness through an additional level
of punctuated interpenetration. This is envisioned as a
single, interlinked biological process.
Various authors have argued for 'non-reductionist'
approaches to tumorigenesis (e.g. [47,48]), including psy-
chosocial stressors as inherent to the process [49]. What is
clear is that, once a mutation has occurred, multiple sys-
tems must fail for tumorigenesis to proceed. It is well
known that processes of DNA repair (e.g.[50]), pro-
grammed cell death – apoptosis – (e.g. [51]), and
immune surveillance (e.g. [52]) all act to redress cell
mutation. The immune system is increasingly viewed as
cognitive, and is known to be equipped with an array of
possible remediations [18,19]. It is, then, possible to infer
a larger, jointly-acting 'mutation control' process incorpo-
rating these and other cellular, systemic, and, in higher
animals, social mechanisms. This clearly must involve
comparison of developing cells with some internal model
of what constitutes a 'normal' pattern, followed by aPage 9 of 13
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or full-blown immune attack. The comparison with an
internal picture of the world, with a subsequent choice
from a response repertoire, is, as Atlan and Cohen [19]
point out, the essence of cognition.
One is led to propose, in the sense of equation (9), that a
mutual information may be defined characterizing the
interaction of a structured system of external selection
pressures with the 'language' of cellular cognition effect-
ing mutation control. Under the Joint Asymptotic Equi-
partition or Rate Distortion Theorems, that mutual
information constitutes a splitting criterion for pairwise
linked paths which may itself be punctuated and subject
to sudden phase transitions.
Pathologically structured externally environmental sig-
nals can become jointly and synergistically linked both
with cell mutation and with the cognitive process which
attempts to redress cell mutation, enhancing the former,
degrading the latter, and significantly raising the probabil-
ity of successful tumorigenesis.
Raised rates of cellular mutation which quite literally
reflect environmental pressure through selection's dis-
torted mirror do not fit a cognitive paradigm: The adap-
tive mutator may propose, but selection disposes.
However, the effect of structured environmental stress on
both the mutator and on mutation control, which itself
constitutes the selection pressure facing a clone of
mutated cells, connects the mechanisms. Subsequent
multiple evolutionary 'learning plateaus' [15] represent-
ing the punctuated interpenetration between mutation
control and clones of mutated cells constitute the stages of
disease. Such stages arise in the context of an embedding
system of environmental signals which, to use a Rate Dis-
tortion argument, literally writes an image of itself on all
aspects of the disease.
These speculations are consistent with, but suggest exten-
sion of, a growing body of research. Kiecolt-Glaser et al.
[53], for example, discuss how chronic inflammation
related to chronic stress has been linked with a spectrum
of conditions associated with aging, including cardiovas-
cular disease, osteoporosis, arthritis, type II diabetes, cer-
tain cancers, and other conditions. Dalgleish [54,55] and
others [56,57] have argued at length that chronic immune
activation and inflammation are closely related to the eti-
ology of cancer and other diseases. As Balkwill and Man-
tovanni [58] put the matter, "If genetic damage is the
'match that lights the fire' of cancer, some types of inflam-
mation may provide 'fuel that feeds the flames' ".
Dalgleish [54] has suggested application of non-linear
mathematics to examine the role of immune response in
cancer etiology, viewing different phenotypic modes of
the immune system – the Th1/Th2 dichotomy – as 'attrac-
tors' for chaotic processes related to tumorigenesis, and
suggests therapeutic intervention to shift from Th2 to Th1.
Such a shift in phenotype might well be viewed as a phase
transition.
This analysis implies a complicated and subtle biology for
cancer in higher animals, one in which external environ-
mental 'messages' become convoluted with both patho-
genic clone mutation and with an opposing, and possibly
organ-specific, variety of tumor control strategies. In the
face of such a biology, anti-inflammants [59] and other
'magic bullet' interventions appear inadequate, a circum-
stance having implications for control of the aging of con-
scious systems which we infer from these examples.
Although chronic inflammation, related certainly to struc-
tured environmental stress, is likely to be a contributor to
the enhancement of pathological mutation and the degra-
dation of corrective response, it is unlikely to be the only
such trigger. The constant cross-talk between central nerv-
ous, hormonal, immune, and tumor control systems in
higher animals guarantees that the 'message' of the exter-
nal environment will write itself upon the full realm of
individual physiology in a highly plieotropic, punctuated,
manner, with multifactorial impact on both cell clone
mutation and tumor control.
Discussion and conclusion
These examples, particularly the model of cancer as an
information disorder [25], suggest that consciousness in
higher animals, the quintessence of information process-
ing, is necessarily accompanied by elaborate regulatory
and corrective processes, both internal and external, to
ensure both the integrity of large-scale brain connectivity
and that the dynamics of the Global Workspace are con-
fined to the topology determined by embedding goal con-
texts. Only a few are well known: Sleep enables the
consolidation and fixation in memory and semiautomatic
mechanism of what has been consciously learned, and
proper social interaction enhances mental fitness in
humans. Other long-evolved, but currently poorly under-
stood, mechanisms probably act as correctives to keep Gil-
bert's evolutionary structures from going off the rails, e.g.
attempting to limit flight-or-fight HPA responses to 'real'
threats, and so on.
Consciousness, a very old adaptation central to the sur-
vival of higher animals, has had the benefit of several hun-
dred million years of evolution to develop the corrective
and compensatory structures for its stability and efficiency
over the life course. Although these are currently not well
characterized, it seems clear that the synergism between
culture and depression that Kleinman and others see asPage 10 of 13
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rally' from equation (9).
The explicit inference, then, is that human consciousness
can suffer interpenetrating dysfunctions of mutual and
reciprocal interaction with embedding environments
which will have early onset and often insidious staged
developmental progression, possibly according to a can-
cer model. These may affect general brain connectivity or
act to degrade the linkage between consciousness and goal
contexts, thus decoupling their topologies. There will be
no simple, reductionist brain chemical 'bug in the pro-
gram' whose 'fix' can fully correct such problems. On the
contrary, the growth of an individual over the life course,
and contact with toxic features of the outside world, can
be expected to initiate developmental disorders which
will become more intrusive over time, most obviously fol-
lowing some damage accumulation model, but likely
according to far more subtle schemes, perhaps analogous
to punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary context [15].
The obvious rate distortion argument suggests that, if an
external information source is pathogenic, then sufficient
exposure to it, especially during critical developmental
periods, is sure to write a sufficiently accurate image of it
on mind and body in a punctuated manner so as to initi-
ate or promote similarly progressively punctuated devel-
opmental dysfunction. Critical periods include, but are
surely not limited to, the uterine environment and early
childhood. Sufficient trauma, particularly when exacer-
bated by post-traumatic secondary victimization, may be
expected to trigger subsequent developmental dysfunc-
tion at any time.
To reiterate, these considerations suggest strongly that, in
parallel with consciousness, an elaborate system of correc-
tion and control must have evolved as well, quite analo-
gous to the elaborate tumor control mechanisms that
necessarily accompany multicellularity.
As is the case with many cancers, the key health interven-
tion, at the population level, is clearly to limit pathogenic
exposures, a matter of proper environmental sanitation,
in a broad sense, largely a question of social justice which
has long been understood to be primarily determined by
the interactions of cultural trajectory, group power rela-
tions, and economic structure with public policy (e.g. [60-
65]).
At the individual level, intervention against mental disor-
ders is likely to be far more problematic, just as it is in the
treatment of cancer, and for analogous reasons. This anal-
ysis suggests that one does not often cure developmental
disorders once they have begun, indeed, a good analogy
seems to be with the onset of chronic organic disease. It is
not at all easy to turn back the developmental clock, and
the parallels with punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary
process suggests a one-way street. The best that can often
be achieved is to trigger or extend remission, either by
encouraging or strengthening mechanisms of natural con-
trol and recovery, or through direct chemical or other
intervention. That is, proper treatment can sometimes
induce long-lasting remission, but this is subject to the
determinants of medical failure, which are often precisely
the factors of cultural trajectory, group power relations,
economic structure, and public policy which are at the
base of many population-level disease patterns. For an
extended discussion see, for example, Wallace and Wal-
lace [66], who find that structured psychosocial stress can
write a literal image of itself onto the success or failure of
individual-level therapeutic intervention, drug-related or
not, just as it can on the development and functioning of
human intelligence and consciousness.
Although one might argue, as with the immune system,
that exposure to 'adverse environments' is necessary to
develop resistance to induction of mental disorders, it
seems likely that this depends on the degree of adversity
and whether that adversity occurs at a developmental crit-
ical point in life history. Failure of maternal attachment in
infancy due to external socioeconomic stressors has
proved to have long-term consequences for hippocampal
neurodevelopment in animal models [14].
We have begun to outline a consciousness-centered per-
spective on mental disorders, both those determined by
defects in large-scale brain connectivity, and possibly by
related failures of embedding goal contexts to constrain
the topological dynamics of the global workspace. Further
work in this direction might well focus on characterizing
specific disorders from this viewpoint, and designing
experiments to test such characterizations.
Equation (9) and the arguments surrounding it, however,
already provide, in the context of mental disorders, quite
a 'hard science' basis for the evolutionary anthropologist
Robert Boyd's oft-repeated assertion that "culture is as
much a part of human biology as the enamel on our
teeth."
Not only culture and socioeconomic status, but historical
trajectory, power relations between individuals and
groups, and the effects of public policy, will write images
of themselves onto the fundamental topology of individ-
ual consciousness, too frequently defining paths of debil-
itating developmental disorder which can blight lives.
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